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SURROGACY AND WINDSOR’S PENUMBRAS 
Susan Frelich Appleton* 
INTRODUCTION 
This symposium, Compensated Surrogacy in the Age of Windsor,1 
explores what the Supreme Court’s invalidation of Section 3 of the 
federal “Defense of Marriage Act” (DOMA) in United States v. 
Windsor2 means for the legal treatment of commercial surrogacy 
arrangements.3 As a scholar with a longstanding interest in family law 
generally and parentage and assisted reproduction in particular, I found 
much to appreciate in the symposium contributions—especially those 
insights that come from examining the issues through the always 
revealing lenses of feminism,4 critical race theory,5 heteronormativity,6 
and outsider narrative.7 
* Lemma Barkeloo & Phoebe Couzins Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. I 
thank my colleagues Deborah Dinner, Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, and Laura Rosenbury for 
valuable comments and conversation. 
1.  89 WASH. L. REV. 1069–1373 (2014). 
2.  133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
3.  Like contributors to the symposium, I use “compensated” and “commercial” interchangeably 
and would contrast this type of surrogacy with arrangements described as “altruistic,” in which the 
surrogate donates her services and receives no pay. See, e.g., Kellye Y. Testy, Foreword: 
Compensated Surrogacy in the Age of Windsor, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1069, 1070 & n.9 (2014). Of 
course, one could consider further distinctions. For example, to what extent does mere 
reimbursement for medical expenses constitute “compensation” even if we would not label the 
arrangement “commercial”? For purposes of my analysis, I assume that a commercial or 
compensated surrogate receives a fee for her services, in addition to reimbursement for her 
expenses. 
4.  Sara L. Ainsworth, Bearing Children, Bearing Risks: Feminist Leadership for Progressive 
Regulation of Compensated Surrogacy in the United States, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1077 (2014); Julie 
Shapiro, For a Feminist Considering Surrogacy, Is Compensation Really the Key Question?, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 1345 (2014); see also Martha A. Field, Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 
1155, 1155 (2014) (raising concerns about the commodification of, inter alia, birthmothers). 
5.  Khiara M. Bridges, Windsor, Surrogacy, and Race, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1125 (2014). 
6.  Anthony C. Infanti, The House of Windsor: Accentuating the Heteronormativity in the Tax 
Incentives for Procreation, 89 WASH L. REV. 1185 (2014). 
7.  Peter Nicolas, Straddling the Columbia: A Constitutional Law Professor’s Musings on 
Circumventing Washington State’s Criminal Prohibition on Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. 
REV. 1235 (2014). Placing contemporary law reform efforts in historical and political contexts also 
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Despite the value of the analyses presented, however, the “prompt”—
Windsor’s implications for commercial surrogacy—originally struck me 
as both superficial and contrived. Perhaps I was thinking too much like a 
lawyer, reacting to the fact that nothing in the Windsor opinions directly 
compels a shift for surrogacy. Put differently, it is not immediately 
obvious that Windsor’s rejection of DOMA’s Section 3 has any bearing 
on state surrogacy laws. Accordingly, for me, Professor Field got it 
exactly right when she wrote: 
Windsor has little relevance to surrogacy, which will continue to 
be governed by state rather than federal law. States do, and will, 
follow a wide spectrum of policies on surrogacy, ranging from 
banning it and making it illegal to promoting it by enforcing 
surrogacy contracts as ordinary commercial transactions. The 
legalization of gay marriage need not affect states’ surrogacy 
laws.8 
Nonetheless, stepping back and situating Windsor and surrogacy in 
broader conversations about gender, marriage, and family law can open 
additional ways to understand the question posed by this symposium. 
From this wider perspective, Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Windsor (like 
various constitutional guarantees) might be said to have “penumbras” 
and “emanations” that reach beyond the case’s direct impact or 
precedential role.9 Below, I briefly consider two such penumbral matters 
pertaining to surrogacy, Windsor’s politics and its repronormativity, 
before turning to a more extended look at a third, Windsor’s federalism. 
Even with this expanded frame, the path from Windsor to significant 
surrogacy reform largely remains uncertain and obscure. Windsor’s 
reasoning about marriage and dignity10 promises only inclusion in the 
system of family law as it is, not fundamental transformation of that 
system itself.11 
proves illuminating. See Terry J. Price, The Future of Compensated Surrogacy in Washington State: 
Anytime Soon?, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1311 (2014). 
8.  See Field, supra note 4, at 1155. 
9.  Most readers will recognize that I am borrowing terms made famous by Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Unable to identify a constitutional provision securing a right to 
privacy, including the protection of married couples’ use of contraception, the majority cited the 
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and invoked their 
“penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.” 
Id. at 484.  
10.  133 S. Ct. at 2692–96. 
11.  See also, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and 
Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. 
L. REV. 1535 (1993). 
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I. WINDSOR’S POLITICS 
Although Windsor stems from the judicial branch, the case has 
political ramifications. First, Windsor now looms large in the social 
movement for LGBTQ rights, spurring marriage-equality advocacy, 
legislation, and court rulings within the states. In the United States 
today, same-sex couples have access to marriage in more than 37 
jurisdictions.12 Just as Justice Scalia’s Windsor dissent predicted,13 the 
portions of the majority opinion that explain how DOMA demeans 
same-sex couples and their families have proved influential in 
challenges to state marriage exclusions, with several courts invoking 
Windsor to invalidate such laws.14 Now that one federal court of appeals 
has refused to embrace this expansive reading of Windsor, the Supreme 
Court has agreed to review the constitutionality of state bans on same-
sex marriage and marriage recognition.15 
Second, beyond its implications for the rapidly developing law and 
politics of marriage equality, Windsor’s emanations might reach even 
farther, as suggested by the argument animating this symposium. This 
argument seems to proceed as follows: To the extent Windsor 
“legitimizes” same-sex couples, it creates increased demand for 
reproductive arrangements that allow such couples to become parents. In 
turn, this demand generates political pressure for reforms that would 
facilitate and regularize such family formation. For example, New York, 
which became a marriage-equality state by legislation before Windsor,16 
now faces pressure to reconsider its prohibition on compensated 
surrogacy, enacted back in 1992.17 A chief proponent of a more 
permissive approach to surrogacy is a New York state senator who, with 
his husband, had a child with the help of a gestational surrogate in 
California.18 Windsor might well fuel such efforts to relax the legal 
12.  According to the advocacy organization Freedom to Marry, same-sex couples can marry in 
37 states, D.C., and some counties in Missouri. Where State Laws Stand, FREEDOM TO MARRY, 
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/where-state-laws-stand (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). 
13.  133 S. Ct. at 2709–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
14.  E.g., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 468, 473–74 (9th Cir.), stay denied, 135 S. Ct. 345 (2014); 
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 659, 671–72 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Bostic 
v. Rainey, 760 F.3d 352, 377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 286 (2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 
F.3d 1193, 1207–08 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014). 
15.  DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sum. nom. Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015). 
16.  New York enacted its Marriage Equality Act in 2011. N.Y. DOM. REL. L. §§ 10-a, 10-b, 11, 
13 (McKinney, Westlaw, through 2015 legislation). 
17.  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 122–23 (McKinney, Westlaw, through 2015 legislation). 
18.  See Anemona Hartocollis, And Surrogacy Makes 3: In New York, a Push for Compensated 
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treatment of surrogacy, although the revision that Windsor works in 
federal law would seem to be a much less influential force here than 
state-level developments that open marriage to same-sex couples. Of 
course, we might think of Windsor as catalyst in the expansion of 
marriage at the state level19 and hence as potential catalyst for surrogacy 
reforms as well. 
Will such Windsor-inspired pressure produce surrogacy reforms? 
Possibly. We might consider, for example, how the demand for less 
onerous divorce rules and the frequent evasion of restrictive laws 
through the practice of migratory divorce sparked the move for divorce 
reform and ultimately brought no-fault divorce statutes to the states.20 If 
“[f]amily law follows family life,”21 as Joanna Grossman and Lawrence 
Friedman contend in their history of modern family law, then a growing 
practice of compensated surrogacy (including resort to out-of-state 
arrangements) should produce a more supportive legal environment. 
Further, LGBTQ advocates have become politically influential and 
could make surrogacy reform their next priority after marriage 
equality.22 
Still, I see significant stumbling blocks. With the fault system of 
divorce, a consensus had emerged that the existing regime caused 
significant harm and provided at most illusory benefits.23 Likewise, the 
shift represented by Windsor came in response to inferences of DOMA’s 
great harm and the absence of evidence that change would pose a 
problem.24 Surrogacy restrictions like New York’s, however, differ from 
both of these precursors. 
First, surrogacy restrictions were enacted amidst worries about the 
exploitation of women and the commodification of children.25 Whatever 
the increased demand for compensated surrogacy, we have not reached a 
consensus that such restrictions reflect misguided concerns or cause 
Surrogacy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2014, at E1 & E6, t 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/fashion/In-New-York-Some-Couples-Push-for-Legalization-
of-Compensated-Surrogacy.html. 
19.  See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
20.  See, e.g., JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW 
AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 159–80 (2011).  
21.  Id. at 2. 
22.  See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 415 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sum. nom. Obergefell 
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015). 
23.  See, e.g., GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 20, at 163. 
24.  See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
25.  See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy, and the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1759 
(1988); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1928–36 (1987). 
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more harm than good.26 Second, in contrast to the law felled by Windsor, 
basic anti-surrogacy laws do not seek to demean and disadvantage 
gays.27 They reflect not anti-LGBTQ animus, which inflicts dignitary 
harms,28 but instead protective policies that were seen at the time of 
enactment to trump the competing interests of even different-sex married 
(but infertile) couples and enterprising would-be “surrogates” 
themselves.29 In other words, when states like New York enacted 
surrogacy restrictions, they did so for the purpose of protecting women 
and children; moreover, they found the need for such protection to 
outweigh the interests of likely surrogacy consumers (then envisioned to 
be married different-sex couples with a fertile husband and an infertile 
wife30) as well as the interests of women who might feel eager to serve 
as gestational carriers for others. 
True, some surrogacy laws might need fine-tuning today, given 
Windsor’s condemnation of DOMA’s discriminatory purpose. For 
example, some states limit surrogacy to married couples31—a category 
that at one time excluded all same-sex couples—and others assume that 
intended parents will be a man and a woman.32 Yet, even before 
Windsor, courts in several states insisted that paternity and parentage 
laws be read in a gender-neutral way, when possible. This approach to 
statutory construction has extended legal recognition as parents to same-
26.  See, e.g., Field, supra note 4; Shapiro, supra note 4. See also Hiring a Woman for Her 
Womb, Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/09/22/hiring-a-woman-for-her-womb (presenting 
different positions, as articulated by two lawyers, an ethicist, a law professor, and a professor of 
obstetrics and psychiatrist). 
27.  The Windsor majority finds telling evidence of DOMA’s discriminatory purpose in the name 
itself: the Defense of Marriage Act. 133 S. Ct. at 2693. 
28.  See id. 
29.  See generally Field, supra note 4. 
30.  This stereotype derives from the highly publicized Baby M case that prompted legislation in 
several states. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (holding compensated traditional 
surrogacy contract void and enforceable). 
31.  E.g., TEX. FAM. CODE § 160.754(b) (2003). 
32.  For example, an early model law, the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception 
Act, promulgated by the National Conference of Commissions of Uniform State Laws (now called 
the Uniform Law Commission or ULC) in 1988, included the following provision for those states 
opting to permit surrogacy: 
“Intended parents” means a man and woman, married to each other, who enter into an 
agreement under this [Act] providing that they will be the parents of a child born to a surrogate 
through assisted conception using egg or sperm of one or both of the intended parents. 
UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 1(3) (1988). The language makes 
clear that same-sex couples would be ineligible as “intended parents.” The ULC’s more recent 
model also contemplates a cross-sex couple as intended parents without requiring their marriage. 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(b) (2002). 
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sex couples and facilitated the intended results of assisted-reproduction 
arrangements for such families.33 To the extent that such developments 
eliminate discriminatory barriers to surrogacy, they address any 
Windsor-related problems. Accordingly, states that still follow gendered 
rules of paternity and parentage might well need to move to a gender-
neutral approach. By contrast, Windsor does not compel revision of 
those restrictions that apply to all surrogacy consumers and reflect more 
general protective policies aimed at commodification and exploitation. 
The possibly increased demand for surrogacy in Windsor’s wake does 
not alter this conclusion. 
To see why we should not expect to see protective policies evaporate 
in the face of Windsor, consider this analogous question: Because many 
same-sex couples add children to their families by adoption, should we 
expect to see post-Windsor relaxation of various protective adoption 
laws—such as requirements for waiting periods34 and home studies,35 
which apply regardless of the sexual orientation or gender of the 
adopters? Of course not. Similarly, the rise of gay married couples and 
their possible demand for surrogacy do not diminish concerns about 
commodification and exploitation—concerns that prompted restrictions 
back when different-sex couples were surrogacy’s principal consumers. 
To conclude otherwise would suggest that the extra quantum of male 
privilege possessed by gay couples would produce political success 
where it has eluded different-sex couples with fertility-challenged wives. 
Such speculation seems far-fetched. Hence, once surrogacy restrictions 
are purged of any elements that target sexual minorities,36 I see no 
reason to expect additional reforms stemming from Windsor. 
33.  See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 665 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing mother’s 
former partner under gender-neutral reading of paternity statute); Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283, 
285 (N. Mex. 2012) (applying presumption of paternity to recognize as second parent mother’s 
former partner who held out adopted child as her own); In re Roberto d. B., 923 A.2d 115, 125 (Md. 
2007) (using gender-neutral reading of state law to allow intended father’s name alone to appear on 
birth certificate of child born to gestational surrogate and conceived with donated egg); see also 
D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 328 (Fla. 2013) (post-Windsor case using gender-neutral reading 
of paternity law). 
34.  See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/9 (Westlaw, through 2015 legislation) (requiring 
valid surrender of child for adoption to take place no sooner than seventy-two hours after birth). 
35.  See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 600.8 (Westlaw, through 2015 legislation) (specifying the 
requirements of “preplacement investigation” and report). 
36.  Here, my argument suggests the familiar distinction between discriminatory intent and 
disparate impact. See, e.g., Richard Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 494–95 (2003) (identifying three types of questions about “[t]he 
relationship between equal protection and facially neutral practices with discriminatory effects”). In 
any event, Windsor makes clear that anti-gay animus played a pivotal role in its analysis. See 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. 
 
                                                     
Appleton-PostDTP.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/14/2015  1:50 PM 
2015] SURROGACY AND WINDSOR’S PENUMBRAS 49 
II. WINDSOR’S REPRONORMATIVITY 
Second, Windsor shares at least attenuated connections with 
surrogacy because of the repronormativity reflected in the majority 
opinion. I use this term, which derives from Katherine Franke’s 
scholarship, to underscore the centrality of children and parenthood in 
Windsor’s vision of marriage and also the centrality of marriage in 
Windsor’s understanding of parenthood and children.37 
While rejecting a model of marriage that depends exclusively on 
procreation,38 the majority opinion nonetheless gave the children of gay 
and lesbian couples a prominent place in its analysis. According to the 
majority, one of DOMA’s fatal flaws lay in its effect on children: 
[Section 3 of DOMA] humiliates tens of thousands of children 
now being raised by same-sex couples. The law in question 
makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the 
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with 
other families in their community and in their daily lives.39 
In these sentences, the Court writes as if all, or at least most, of the 
married couples marginalized by DOMA have children—despite the 
childless marriage of Edith Windsor, who brought the case. In this way, 
the majority’s effort to celebrate diversity in marriage reinforces a vision 
of marriage tied to children and childrearing. 
Whatever its direct legal effect, then, Windsor stands out as a high-
profile cultural and social artifact that sends strong signals about 
marriage norms. Windsor could have invalidated DOMA without 
mentioning children, citing their numbers, or expressing empathy for 
their feelings. The stakes for childless same-sex couples could have 
amply justified the outcome, as Windsor’s own tax burden 
demonstrates.40 The Court made a choice, citing a marriage-equality 
argument designed to tug at the heartstrings of those who might find 
37.  Although Katherine Franke famously uses “repronormativity” to critique the centrality of 
motherhood in feminist agendas, I use the term more broadly here, to call attention to the Windsor 
Court’s assumptions about marriage. Windsor not only emphasizes the place of children in 
marriage; it also suggests that, without marriage, children suffer emotional harm. Put differently, 
while Franke challenges the centrality of motherhood in legal feminism, I point out centrality of 
parenthood in Windsor’s rationale. See Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on 
Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 183 (2001). 
38.  Justice Alito’s dissent criticizes the majority on this ground. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 
2718–19 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing two understandings of marriage, one based on 
procreation and the other based on consent, and asserting that Congress and the states may choose 
which to endorse through their enactments). 
39.  Id. at 2694. 
40.  See id. at 2683–85. 
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“second-tier marriage”41 a not especially compelling problem (or even 
well-deserved marginalization) when it disadvantages only adults.42 
In so doing, the Windsor majority entrenched a limited view of 
family, realizing a hazard that some observers have identified in 
contemporary gay rights advocacy.43 This symposium’s premise—
linking Windsor to surrogacy—not only illuminates this feature of 
Windsor, but also strengthens it. This paradigm excludes many family 
forms, for example, unmarried couples and individuals who might use 
surrogacy, unmarried and married couples who want no children, and a 
host of other affiliations and domestic situations, from friendships to 
polyamory.44 A robust commitment to pluralism among families would 
decenter married couples and families with children—understanding 
these as just a few of many possible familial arrangements. 
Whatever its merits or problems—as a matter of substance or judicial 
strategy—Windsor’s repronormativity only returns us to the issue of 
Windsor’s politics. Even if Windsor’s repronormativity could be said 
indirectly to increase demand for surrogacy, translating such demand 
into concrete pro-surrogacy reforms remains unlikely, especially where 
demand by different-sex couples has failed to achieve that end. In the 
meantime, the argument itself has troubling implications for family 
pluralism. 
III. WINDSOR’S FEDERALISM 
The Windsor majority’s compassion for families headed by same-sex 
married couples, its antisubordination theme,45 and its professed concern 
for humiliated children46 have all largely eclipsed its encomium to 
41.  Id. at 2684. 
42.  Later opinions have picked up on Windsor’s child-focused reasoning. See, e.g., Baskin v. 
Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 659, 671–72 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); DeBoer v. Snyder, 
772 F.3d 388, 422 (6th Cir. 2014) (Daughtrey, J., dissenting), cert. granted sum. nom. Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015). 
43.  See, e.g., NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL 
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2009); Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. 
Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004); see also Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007). 
44.  See, e.g., POLIKOFF, supra note 43; Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory 
Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004); Katherine 
M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685 (2008); see also Rachel F. Moran, How 
Second-Wave Feminism Forgot the Single Woman, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 223 (2004). 
45.  See supra notes 10, 13–14, and accompanying text. 
46.  See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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federalism.47 This part of the opinion emphasizes the traditional control 
of families and family relationships by the states, in turn prompting a 
skeptical look at Congress’s intervention through DOMA.48 Most federal 
district courts and courts of appeals, in relying on Windsor to invalidate 
state bans both on same-sex marriage and on recognition of such 
marriages performed elsewhere, have glossed over the Court’s 
reaffirmation of federalism in family law. Instead, these courts have 
stressed Windsor’s condemnation of unequal treatment.49 
The current regulation of surrogacy epitomizes the federalist or 
localist approach to family law that Windsor embraces. In fact, taken 
seriously, this strand of the Windsor opinion poses difficulties for those 
who now ask the Supreme Court to require all states to license and 
recognize marriages of same-sex couples. A majority of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit pointed out this problem in the case 
currently under consideration by the Supreme Court.50 Assuming that 
marriage-equality advocates will nonetheless prevail when the Supreme 
Court decides this case, gendered entry requirements for marriage will 
join many other aspects of family law in which state rules have had to 
yield to federal constitutional protections. For example, states no longer 
exercise unfettered control over limitations on contraception51 and 
abortion,52 the parental status of unmarried fathers,53 the treatment of 
nonmarital children,54 and visitation by grandparents and other third 
parties.55 Add to constitutional constraints the often-used power of 
Congress to shape state family laws by attaching conditions to federal 
funding56 or in enacting family-affecting statutes on taxation, welfare, 
and employment benefits,57 and it becomes tempting to agree completely 
47.  133 S. Ct. at 2689–93. 
48.  See id. 
49.  See supra note 14 (citing illustrative cases) and accompanying text. The principal outlier is 
the opinion from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, to which the Supreme Court has 
granted review. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
50.  DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 413–15 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sum. nom. Obergefell 
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015). 
51.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
52.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
53.  See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
54.  See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1971); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). 
55.  See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
56.  E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 667(a)–(b) (2012) (child support guidelines); 42 U.S.C. §§ 673b, 675(5) 
(2012) (Adoption and Safe Families Act).  
57.  See JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 45–59 (2014) (examining various 
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with those who see federalism in family law as a myth.58 
Against this background of extensive federal authority and influence, 
however, the “legal patchwork”59 or “maze of laws, state by state”60 
applicable to surrogacy today provides a telling counterexample. 
Surrogacy helps sustain the traditional story that family law belongs to 
the states. 
The state-by-state variation in laws governing surrogacy61 results in 
several predictable consequences. First, supporters of surrogacy have 
pursued several different paths toward eliminating bans and decreasing 
restrictions. Some have focused their reformist efforts on state 
legislatures.62 Others have called for a national statute allowing 
surrogacy63 or the elimination of most limitations through judicial 
recognition of a constitutional right to procreate by means of 
surrogacy.64 Yet, law reform projects do not always yield hoped-for 
outcomes and, in any event, take time.65 
Thus, a second, more practical and immediately available response 
for those in restrictive states entails arrangements that take advantage of 
the laws of more surrogacy-friendly jurisdictions. For example, 
Professor Nicolas, who lives in Washington (which bans surrogacy), 
describes how such considerations figured in his and his husband’s plans 
to have a child.66 First, he considered attempting to locate a surrogate in 
California because of its especially hospitable laws.67 Ultimately, for 
reasons of proximity and costs, he chose to work with a woman in 
nearby Oregon, where he found compensated surrogacy flourishing “in 
federal laws affecting families). 
58.  Id. at 17–66 (challenging canonical narrative of family law as local, not federal, law); 
Courtney G. Joslin, Federalism and Family Status, 90 IND. L.J. 787 (2015) (critiquing the “myth” of 
“family law localism”). 
59.  Nicolas, supra note 7, at 1239. 
60.  Tamar Lewin, Surrogates and Couples Face Maze of Laws, State by State, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
18, 2014, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/us/surrogates-and-couples-face-a-maze-of-
laws-state-by-state.html.  
61.  For a survey of the various state approaches and their categorization into six identifiable 
groupings, see Nicolas, supra note 7, at 1240–45. 
62.  See, e.g., Hartocollis, supra note 18, at E1; Price, supra note 7. 
63.  E.g., Caitlin Conklin, Note, Simply Inconsistent: Surrogacy Laws in the United States and the 
Pressing Need for Regulation, 35 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 67, 92–94 (2013). 
64.  JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 32–40 (1993); Nicolas, supra note 7, at 1279–98. 
65.  See Price, supra note 7. 
66.  Nicolas, supra note 7, at 1245–55. 
67.  Id. at 1245. 
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the shadows,” that is, despite the absence of explicitly relevant law.68 
The phenomenon of traveling to a state with more attractive laws 
occurs frequently in family law. Other examples, past and present, 
include migratory divorce before the advent of no-fault statutes69 and 
today’s efforts to avoid local abortion regulations.70 
The likelihood that state surrogacy restrictions would prompt evasion 
in this familiar fashion surfaced for consideration as soon as New Jersey 
began to contemplate legislative responses invited by the provocative 
Baby M case in 1988.71 As part of that process, the New Jersey Bioethics 
Commission consulted me about the conflict of laws implications of a 
ban on surrogacy that the state was contemplating. My analysis, later 
revised for publication as a law review article,72 concluded that New 
Jersey would have considerable difficulty limiting surrogacy so long as 
those eager to participate in such arrangements could find more 
permissive jurisdictions. Accordingly, I wrote: 
[A]ssuming residents of a restrictive state truly want to 
participate in surrogacy, the existence of more hospitable 
jurisdictions will significantly limit local control. Absent federal 
legislation or a single uniform act (without alternatives) adopted 
by all the states, restrictive states can hope to achieve their goals 
only through resort to untested extensions of criminal law or 
creative solutions making the family formed through surrogacy 
vulnerable to continuing risks.73 
Subsequent case law confirmed my suspicions. Consider Hodas v. 
Morin,74 in which a couple from Connecticut commissioned a New York 
68.  Id. at 1246–49. 
69.  See, e.g., David P. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and 
Borax, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 26 (1966). 
70.  See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Activists Help Pay for Patients’ Travel to Shrinking Number of 
Abortion Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2014,  http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/28/us/advocates-
help-pay-for-travel-to-a-shrinking-number-of-abortion-clinics.html; Samantha Liss, Out-of-State 
Abortion Providers Ready to Treat More Missouri Women, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 25, 
2014, http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/medical/out-of-state-abortion-providers-
ready-to-treat-more-missouri/article_871a4f64-2579-5dd1-b380-ef042ed28e06.html.  
71.  537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (holding compensated traditional surrogacy contract void and 
unenforceable). 
72.  Susan Frelich Appleton, Surrogacy Arrangements and the Conflict of Laws, 1990 WIS. L. 
REV. 399, 401 (1990). 
73.  Id. at 401. The reference to alternatives stems from the Uniform Status of Children of 
Assisted Conception Act, which offered enacting states two options, Alternative A, permitting but 
regulating surrogacy, and Alternative B, making surrogacy agreements void—in turn undermining 
the uniformity that might be achieved by this so-called uniform act. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF 
ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (1988). 
74.  814 N.E.2d 320 (Mass. 2004). 
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woman to serve as a gestational carrier and bear for them a child 
conceived with their genes, with the embryo transfer taking place in 
Connecticut. Connecticut had no controlling authority on the subject, but 
New York “expressly prohibit[ed] gestational carrier agreements in 
order to protect women against exploitation as gestational carriers and to 
protect the gestational carrier’s potential parental rights,”75 thus 
expressing “a ‘fundamental policy’ on a matter in which it [had] a great 
interest.”76 By contrast, Massachusetts, based on precedent, allowed the 
name of intended, genetic parents to be entered on the birth certificate 
even when another woman bears the child,77 facilitating the objectives of 
those entering a gestational surrogacy arrangement. Among these 
disparate laws, the parties wanted Massachusetts law to govern 
parentage and the birth certificate, and they included a choice of law 
provision to that effect in their agreement.78 
Using the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts followed the parties’ contractual choice 
of law.79 The court deemed purely manufactured connections—the 
agreement that the birth would take place at a Massachusetts hospital, if 
possible, and the administration of some prenatal care in that state—
sufficient to justify this choice of law.80 Accordingly, the parties to the 
contract completely evaded New York’s restriction even though the 
court conceded that the gestational surrogate, who lived in that state, 
came within the scope of its protective policy.81 
As Hodas illustrates, what makes a regime appealing to participants 
in a surrogacy arrangement is not merely the absence of a prohibition or 
criminal sanctions. Rather, state parentage rules play a vital role as well. 
For this reason, California’s doctrine of intent-based parentage has 
attracted many surrogacy participants.82 
Windsor’s assertions about federalism in family law fit quite 
75.  Id. at 325. 
76.  Id. 
77.  Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1139 (Mass. 2001). 
78.  Hodas, 814 N.E.2d at 322. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. 
81.  See id. at 325. 
82.  E.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); see Lewin, supra note 60 (“California has 
the most permissive law [in the U.S.], allowing anyone to hire a woman to carry a baby and the 
birth certificate to carry the names of the intended parents. As a result, California has a booming 
surrogacy industry, attracting clients from around the world.”). Another aspect of the regulatory 
regime, fees and costs, explains why American reproductive tourists often go abroad—although this 
practice takes us away from the question of federalism. 
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comfortably with significant variation in surrogacy and parentage laws 
across this country, along with the experimentation and travel that such 
variation invites. Thus, this penumbral link between Windsor and 
surrogacy supports, rather than challenges, the present patchwork, with 
its mix of restrictive and permissive laws.83 
CONCLUSION 
The conversation about the appropriate legal treatment of surrogacy 
began in earnest over twenty-five years ago with the Baby M litigation 
and its aftermath. Although the conversation has continued, 
inconsistency and discord persist. Some states have opted for a 
restrictive regime, others have taken a permissive approach, and still 
others have remained silent. Scholars, commentators, and the public 
remain divided as well.84 
Windsor’s invalidation of Section 3 of DOMA does nothing to settle 
these longstanding contests. Indeed, precisely because Windsor’s 
significance lies in its move toward full inclusion of gay and lesbian 
couples in mainstream family law, this landmark case spells no major 
break with the past for surrogacy. If we look beyond Windsor’s direct 
legal impact, we find that its penumbras—its political, social, and 
cultural signals; its promotion of a repronormative understanding of 
marriage and family; and its approval of family law federalism—might 
refresh our conversations about surrogacy, adding timely talking points, 
but without significantly disrupting surrogacy’s status quo. 
 
83.  See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
84.  See, e.g., Hiring a Woman for Her Womb, supra note 26. 
 
                                                     
